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The Dynamic Effects of Personal and Corporate  
Income Tax Changes in the United States†
By Karel Mertens and Morten O. Ravn*
This paper estimates the dynamic effects of changes in taxes in the 
United States. We distinguish between changes in personal and cor-
porate income taxes and develop a new narrative account of federal 
tax liability changes in these two tax components. We develop an 
estimator which uses narratively identified tax changes as proxies 
for structural tax shocks and apply it to quarterly post-WWII data. 
We find that short run output effects of tax shocks are large and that 
it is important to distinguish between different types of taxes when 
considering their impact on the labor market and on expenditure 
components. (JEL E23, E62, H24, H25, H31, H32)
This paper presents evidence on the aggregate effects of changes in federal tax 
policy in the United States in the post-WWII sample. Exogenous changes in taxes 
are identified in a vector autoregressive model by proxying latent tax shocks with 
narratively identified tax liability changes. We discriminate between the effects of 
changes in average personal income tax rates (APITRs) and the effects of changes 
in average corporate income tax rates (ACITRs). We find large short run effects 
on aggregate output of unanticipated changes in either tax rates. Cuts in personal 
income taxes lead to a fall in tax revenues while corporate income tax cuts on aver-
age have little impact on tax revenues. Cuts in APITRs raise employment, consump-
tion and investment. Cuts in ACITRs boost investment, do not affect or even lower 
private consumption, and have no immediate effects on employment.
The key challenge when estimating the impact of changes in economic policies 
is identification. In the case of tax policy shocks this is particularly difficult both 
because of endogeneity and because of the diversity of policy instruments. The 
existing literature has often concentrated on exogenous changes in total tax revenues 
but there is little reason to expect that the many types of taxes available to govern-
ments all have the same impact on the economy and therefore can be summarized 
in a single tax measure. We look instead at two more homogenous tax categories, 
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personal and corporate income taxes, which in total account for more than 90  percent 
of total federal tax revenues.
Endogeneity has been addressed in alternative ways in the literature. One line 
of papers uses the narrative approach to identify exogenous tax changes and 
estimates their effects by regressing observables on narratively identified policy 
shocks, e.g., Romer and Romer (2010). An attractive feature of this approach is 
that narrative accounts summarize the relevant features of a potentially very large 
information set. On the other hand, a concern with the existing literature is that 
the narratively identified exogenous changes in policy instruments are implicitly 
viewed as mapping one-to-one into the true structural shocks. In practice there are 
good reasons to expect that narratively identified shocks suffer from measurement 
errors as historical records rarely are sufficiently unequivocal that calls of judg-
ment can be avoided. An alternative approach adopts structural vector autoregres-
sions (SVARs) and achieves identification by exploiting institutional features of 
tax and transfer systems, see e.g., Blanchard and Perotti (2002), or by introducing 
sign restrictions derived from economic theory, see Mountford and Uhlig (2009). 
This approach has the advantage that VARs provide a parsimonious characteriza-
tion of the shock transmission mechanism but identification requires parameter 
restrictions that may be questioned.
In this paper we develop an estimation strategy that exploits the attractive fea-
tures of both SVARs and the narrative approach, but at the same time addresses 
key weaknesses of the existing approaches. Our methodology exploits the infor-
mational content of narrative measures of exogenous changes in taxes for iden-
tification in an SVAR framework. We propose imposing the restrictions that 
narrative measures of exogenous tax changes correlate with latent tax shocks 
but are orthogonal to other structural shocks. The main idea is to complement 
the usual VAR residual covariance restrictions with these moment conditions to 
achieve identification and thereby avoid making direct assumptions on structural 
parameters. We show that the resulting estimator effectively extends the use of 
the narrative approach to cases in which the narrative shock series is measured 
with error. Under some additional assumptions it also produces an estimate of the 
reliability of the narrative measures of policy shocks making it possible to judge 
their quality.
Given our focus on disaggregated taxes, we construct a new narrative account of 
shocks to average personal and corporate tax rates for the United States. This narra-
tive is developed from Romer and Romer’s (2010) account of changes in federal US 
tax liabilities which we decompose into changes in personal and corporate income 
tax liabilities. We only use tax changes that Romer and Romer (2009a) classify as 
exogenous. Following Mertens and Ravn (2012a), we also exclude legislative tax 
changes with implementation lags exceeding one quarter to remove anticipated tax 
changes. The disaggregation of the Romer tax shocks poses new challenges because 
of the correlation between legislated changes in personal and corporate taxes, which 
we resolve with recursivity assumptions.
Based on this methodology, we find in our benchmark specification that a 
1  percentage point cut in the APITR raises real GDP per capita by 1.4 percent on impact 
and by up to 1.8 percent after three quarters. A 1 percentage point cut in the ACITR 
raises real GDP per capita on impact by 0.4 percent and by 0.6 percent after one year. 
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Cuts in personal income taxes lower tax revenues while cuts in corporate taxes have 
no significant impact on revenues because of a very elastic response of the tax base. 
Translated into multipliers (the change in output deriving from a change in tax rates 
which reduce tax revenues by 1 percent of GDP), our estimates imply a maximum 
personal income tax multiplier of 2.5. The corporate income tax multiplier is instead 
not well defined because we find that changes in corporate income taxes have little 
impact on tax revenues.
We find no signs of any significant change in government spending or short 
term nominal interest rates following tax shocks. However, changes in both types 
of taxes have important but distinct effects on other macroeconomic aggregates. A 
cut in the APITR raises employment, lowers the unemployment rate, and increases 
hours worked per worker. A cut in the ACITR, on the other hand, has no immediate 
impact on either employment or hours per worker. Both cuts in the APITR and in the 
ACITR increase private sector investment, but only cuts in personal income taxes 
stimulate private consumption. Cuts in corporate income taxes instead have little 
effect on private consumption in the short run. The differences in the size and signs 
of the responses to the two types of taxes demonstrate the necessity of discriminat-
ing between different types of taxes.
With some additional assumptions about the nature of the measurement error, 
our estimation approach produces a measure of the reliability of the narrative series 
that may be of independent interest. This measure leads to estimates of the squared 
correlation between linear combinations of the narrative shocks and the true struc-
tural tax shocks. We estimate correlations between the principal components of the 
narrative tax shock measures and the latent tax shocks of 0.55 and 0.83. Thus, the 
narratives contain valuable information for identification purposes but measurement 
error is nonetheless a relevant concern in practical applications.
The empirical findings support several conclusions relevant to the ongoing debate 
on fiscal policy. Given the currently available evidence on the multipliers associ-
ated with US government spending, see Ramey (2011b) for a recent review, our 
estimates indicate that the federal tax multipliers are likely to be larger than those 
associated with federal government purchases. If policy objectives include short run 
job creation and consumption stimulus, then cuts to personal income taxes are more 
effective than cuts to corporate profit taxes. If the objective is to raise tax revenues, 
increases in personal income taxes are effective, but the costs in terms of job and 
output losses are relatively large. Increases in corporate profit taxes are not likely to 
raise significant revenues.
I. Estimation and Identification
The main idea of our estimation procedure is to exploit information contained 
in narrative accounts of policy changes to identify structural shocks in an SVAR 
framework. In Section IA, we describe the formal econometric framework and state 
the identifying assumptions on which our impulse response estimates are based. 
Section IB provides a measurement error interpretation of our framework. We make 
specific assumptions about the error in measurement to elicit potential sources of 
bias in more conventional narrative approaches and propose measures of statistical 
reliability to quantify the quality of identification.
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A. General Methodology
Let  Y t be an n × 1 vector of observables. We assume that the dynamics of the 
observables are described by a system of linear simultaneous equations,
(1) A Y t =  ∑ 
j=1
p
  α j  Y t−j +  ε t ,
where A is an n × n nonsingular matrix of coefficients,  α j , j = 1, . . , p, are n × n 
coefficient matrices and  ε t is an n × 1 vector of structural shocks with E[ ε t ] = 0, 
E[ ε t  ε t ′ ] = I, E[ ε t  ε s ′ ] = 0 for s ≠ t where I is the identity matrix. The specification 
in (1) omits deterministic terms and exogenous regressors for notational brevity. An 
equivalent representation of the dynamics of  Y t is
(2)  Y t =  ∑ 
j=1
p
  δ j  Y t−j + B ε t ,
where B =  A −1 ,  δ j =  A −1 α j .
In the SVAR literature  ε t is treated as a vector of latent variables that are estimated 
on the basis of the prediction errors of  Y t conditional on the information contained 
in the vector of lagged dependent variables  X t =  [  Y t−1 ′ , . . ,  Y t−p ′ ] ′, and by imposing 
identifying assumptions. Let the n × 1 vector  u t denote the reduced form residuals 
which are related to the structural shocks by
(3)  u t = B ε t .
Since E[ u t  u t ′ ] = BB′, an estimate of the covariance matrix of  u t provides n(n + 1)/2 
independent identifying restrictions. However, identification of the elements of at least 
one of the columns of B requires more identifying restrictions. The fiscal SVAR lit-
erature has accomplished this task in a variety of ways. For instance, Blanchard and 
Perotti (2002) exploit institutional features of the US tax system and policy reaction 
lags to impose coefficient restrictions on B. Alternatively, Mountford and Uhlig (2009) 
impose sign restrictions on the impulse response functions implied by (2).
We propose instead to obtain covariance restrictions from proxies for the latent 
shocks. Let  m t be a k × 1 vector of proxy variables that are correlated with k 
structural shocks of interest but orthogonal to other shocks. Consider the partition 
 ε t = [ ε 1t ′ ,  ε 2t ′ ]′, where  ε 1t is the k × 1 vector containing the shocks of interest and the (n − k ) × 1 vector  ε 2t contains all other n − k shocks.1 Without loss of generality 
we assume that E[ m t ] = 0. The proxy variables can be used for identification of B as 
long as the following conditions are satisfied:
(4) E [ m t  ε 1t ′ ] = Φ
(5) E [ m t  ε 2t ′ ] = 0,
1 We assume that  m t and  ε 1t are of the same dimension k. The analysis can be extended to the case where multiple 
proxy variables are available, i.e., dim( m t ) > k.
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where Φ is an unknown nonsingular k × k matrix. The first condition states that 
the proxy variables are correlated with the shocks of interest. The second condition 
requires that the proxy variables are uncorrelated with all other shocks. These are 
the key identifying assumptions which translate to additional linear restrictions on 
the elements of B.
Consider the following partitioning of B:
with nonsingular  β 11 and  β 22 . Conditions (3)–(5) imply that
(6) Φ  β 1 ′ =  Σ m u ′  ,
where henceforth we use the notation  Σ  x 1t  x 2t  ≡ E[ x 1t  x 2t ] for any random vectors 
or matrices  x 1t and  x 2t . The system in (6), which is of dimension n × k, provides 
additional identifying restrictions but also depends on the  k 2 unknown elements 
of Φ. Because we do not wish to make any assumptions on Φ other than nonsin-
gularity, equation (6) provides really only (n − k)k new identification restrictions. 
Partitioning  Σ m u ′  = [ Σ m u 1 ′   Σ m u 2 ′  ], where  Σ m u 1 ′  is k × k and  Σ m u 2 ′  is k × (n − k) and 
using (6), these restrictions can be expressed as
(7)   β 21 = ( Σ m u 1 ′  −1   Σ m u 2 ′  )′  β 11 .
Since  Σ m u 1 ′  −1  Σ m u 2 ′  is estimable, this constitutes a set of covariance restrictions of the 
type discussed in Hausman and Taylor (1983). In practice, estimation can proceed 
in three stages:
 • First Stage: Estimate the reduced form VAR by least squares.
 • Second Stage: Estimate  Σ m u 1 ′  −1  Σ m u 2 ′  from regressions of the VAR residuals 
on  m t .
 • Final Stage: Impose the restrictions in (7) and estimate the objects of inter-
est, if necessary in combination with further identifying assumptions.
In the final stage, whether the restrictions in (7) suffice to identify the impact coef-
ficients  β 1 depends on k. For the case of a single shock, k = 1, no further assump-
tions are required and  ε 1t is identified up to a sign convention. When k > 1, the 
restrictions in (7) need to be complemented with additional restrictions that may 
vary with the particular application. Traditional short or long run restrictions can 
also be added to (7) to identify the other shocks  ε 2t for which proxies may not 
be available. Hausman and Taylor (1983) develop necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for identification with general linear restrictions such as in (7) and also pro-
vide an equivalent instrumental variables interpretation. In our case, the estimate of 
 Σ m u 1 ′  −1  Σ m u 2 ′  corresponds to the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator in a 
B =  [  β 1 n×k    β 2  n×(n−k) ] ,  β 1 =  [ β 11 ′ k×k    β 21 ′  k×(n−k) ] ′ ,  β 2 =  [  β 12 ′  (n−k)×k    β 22 ′  (n−k)×(n−k) ] ′,
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 regression from  u 2t on  u 1t using  m t as instruments for  u 1t . Conditions (4)–(5) can 
therefore also be viewed as the instrument validity conditions for this regression.2
Our procedure avoids direct assumptions on the elements of B, as in Blanchard 
and Perotti (2002) or Mountford and Uhlig (2009). The key requirement is the 
availability of proxies that satisfy (4)–(5). For identifying structural tax shocks, 
we propose to use narratively identified measures of exogenous shocks to average 
tax rates as proxies. The use of narrative accounts has a long-standing tradition in 
macroeconomics in the estimation of the effects of, for instance, fiscal and monetary 
policy shocks.3 Existing applications of the narrative approach typically estimate 
the response to structural innovations by regressing the observables on (distributed 
lags of) the narratives or by adding them as variables in a VAR. In most of these 
applications, the interpretation of the results relies on implicit assumptions on Φ, the 
covariance between the narratives and the latent structural innovations.
Our approach differs in that it does not require assumptions on Φ other than non-
singularity. For instance, we do not require that the proxies correlate perfectly with 
the true latent shocks  ε 1t or that each proxy is correlated with only a single struc-
tural shock. It is also not necessary that E[ m t  X t ′ ] = 0, i.e., that the proxy variables 
are orthogonal to the history of  Y t . However, this condition is testable and when a 
candidate narrative measure  ~ mt is correlated with  X t , then  m t can be the error from 
projecting  ~ mt on  X t . Since in this case  m t is more informative for  ε 1t than  ~ mt , we 
henceforth also assume that the proxy variables are orthogonal to  X t . A more impor-
tant advantage of our approach is robustness to various types of measurement error, 
which is discussed next.
B. Measurement Problems and Reliability
Narrative measures of monetary or fiscal policy changes are best viewed as imper-
fectly correlated with (linear combinations of) the latent structural policy shocks. 
These measures are constructed from historical sources and summarize information 
about the size, timing, and motivation of policy interventions. But measurement 
errors are likely since historical records sometimes contradict each other and calls 
of judgment are in practice impossible to avoid. Narrative shock series also typically 
neglect more minor policy interventions and have many observations that are cen-
sored to zero. Moreover, in our application to taxes, it is often difficult to measure 
exactly the full implications of new tax legislation on effective tax rates.
These measurement problems invalidate the use of the narratives as direct obser-
vations of structural shocks and can bias estimates in regressions that rely on a one-
to-one mapping between the narrative accounts and the true structural shocks. The 
methodology we propose above is instead robust to many types of measurement 
problems. As long as conditions (4)–(5) hold, the precise nature of the measurement 
2 After submitting this paper, we became aware of Stock and Watson (2008) who suggest the equivalent imple-
mentation of the identification strategy through IV regressions for the case where k = 1. More recently, Stock and 
Watson (2012) apply the same approach in a dynamic factor model to disentangle the causes of the 2007–2009 
recession. Our methodology is also related to Nevo and Rosen (2012) who use weaker covariance restrictions to 
achieve partial identification, and Evans and Marshall (2009) who identify shocks in VARs with the aid of auxiliary 
shock measures derived from economic models.
3 Prominent examples include Romer and Romer (1989, 2010), Ramey and Shapiro (1998), Burnside, 
Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2004), Cloyne (2013), and Ramey (2011a).
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error does not affect the identification of the impulse responses. In order to make 
the potential bias from ignoring measurement problems explicit, we proceed by 
making some specific assumptions about the mapping between the proxies derived 
from narrative measures and the latent shocks. The additional structure also leads to 
formal measures of the statistical reliability of the proxies as measurements of the 
latent shocks, which permits one to assess their relevance. Low values of these reli-
ability statistics indicate that the proxies may not contain much information useful 
for identification.
Consider an augmented system consisting of the SVAR in (2) and the following 
system of measurement equations:
(8)  m t =  D t  ( Γ ε 1t +  υ t ) ,
where Γ is a k × k nonsingular matrix,  υ t is a k × 1 vector of measurement errors 
with E[ υ t ] = 0, E[ υ t  ε 1t ′ ] = 0, E[ υ t  υ t ′ ] =  Σ υ υ ′  and E[ υ t  υ s ′ ] = 0 for s ≠ t.  D t is a 
k × k diagonal matrix containing random (0, 1)-indicators tracking zero observa-
tions. We assume that the diagonal elements of  D t are perfectly correlated, i.e., 
when k > 1 the proxy variables are identically censored. We also assume that 
E[ D t  υ t  ε 1t ′ ] = 0, but we do not require that the censoring process  D t is independent 
of  ε 1t . The stochastic process for the proxies in equation (8) allows for (i) censoring, 
including the possibility that larger realizations (in absolute value) of  ε 1t are more 
likely to be measured; (ii) additive correlated measurement errors  υ t ; and (iii) an 
arbitrary scale. Scaling problems are particularly relevant for tax narratives since 
available estimates of changes in tax liabilities typically assume that the tax base 
remains invariant after legislative changes to the tax code.
Combining (8) with the SVAR in (2) results in a system of structural equations 
with latent variables, as discussed in Bollen (1989). Rewrite the model as
(9)  Y t = θ′  X t ∗ +  w t ,
where  X t ∗ = [ Y t−1 ′ , ... ,  Y t−p ′ ,  ε 1t ′ ]′, θ = [δ′,  β 1 ]′, δ = [ δ 1 , . . ,  δ p ]′ and  w t =  β 2  ε 2t .  X t ∗ is 
not fully observable because it contains  ε 1t . The enlarged system is a measurement 
error model of the form
(10)   Y t = γ′   _ Xt +  z t 
(11)  _ Xt = Ω  X t ∗ +  ϒ t ,
where  
_ Xt = [ Y t−1 ′ , … ,  Y t−p ′ ,  m t ′ ]′ and
  θ = Ω′γ ,  w t =  z t + γ′  ϒ t , Ω =  [  I     0  0    Γ  ] ,  ϒ t =  [  0                          D t  υ t + ( D t −  I k ) Γ  ε 1t   ] .
Note that because of censoring, E[ X t ∗  ϒ t ′ ] ≠ 0 and  ϒ t is therefore not classical mea-
surement error. From  Σ  _ Xw ′  = 0, we obtain
(12) θ = Ω′  Λ  _ X −1  Σ  _ XX′  −1  Σ  _ XY ,
1219mertens and ravn: dynamic effects of tax changesvoL. 103 no. 4
where  Λ  _ X is the reliability matrix of (the uncensored realizations) of  _ Xt , given by
(13)  Λ  _ X =  [   I   0  0                 Σ m m ′  −1 ΦΓ′  ] .
Most existing narrative studies estimate a version of (10) (often also including 
lags of  m t ) but unless there is no measurement error, the resulting naïve estimator 
Σ  _ XX′  −1  Σ  _ XY is generally biased because of scaling (Ω′ ≠ I), and measurement error ( Λ  _ X −1 ≠ I).4 The elements of θ reduce to
 δ =  Σ X X ′  −1  Σ X Y ′  ,  β 1 ′ =  Φ −1  Σ m Y ′  .
Note that, since  Σ m Y ′  =  Σ m u ′  , the three-stage procedure described in the previous 
section is equivalent to estimating a measurement error model in which  Y t has per-
fect reliability and  m t is measured with error.
Under the additional assumption of independent random censoring, it is possible 
to identify the statistical reliability matrix (13), see the Appendix for details. In that 
case, the k × k reliability matrix of  m t is given by
(14) Λ =  Σ m m ′  −1  E [ D t ] ΓΓ′.
When k = 1, Λ is the fraction of the variance in the uncensored measurements that 
is explained by the variance of the latent variable or equivalently the squared corre-
lation between the narrative measure and the true structural shock of interest. Since 
0 ≤ Λ ≤ 1, measurement error bias manifests itself in this case as shrinkage toward 
zero. When k > 1, the bias can go in either direction. The eigenvalues of Λ can be 
interpreted as the scalar reliabilities of the principal components of the uncensored 
observations in  m t . Λ provides a metric for evaluating how closely the proxy vari-
ables are related to the true shocks, and is suggestive for the quality of identification. 
SVAR shocks are sometimes criticized for being at odds with historical events or 
descriptive records, see for instance Rudebusch (1998). The reliability of proxies 
constructed from the historical record of policy changes quantifies the extent to 
which this criticism applies.
II. Do Tax Cuts Stimulate Economic Activity?
In this section we apply our methodology to the estimation of the impact of exog-
enous tax shocks on economic activity in the United States over the postwar period. 
Here we concentrate mainly on the effects on output. The subsequent section pro-
vides evidence for a broader set of macroeconomic aggregates.
The empirical analysis in this paper differs from existing estimates of the effects 
of unexpected changes in tax policy in three ways. First, we apply the SVAR esti-
mator presented above using legislated federal tax changes as proxies. Second, we 
take several steps to ensure that our estimates are not affected by the fact that many 
tax changes are anticipated. Third, while much of the macro literature has estimated 
4 If k > 1, the proxy variables are not identically censored and if the off-diagonal elements of Γ are nonzero, (13) 
needs to be further decomposed into a reliability matrix and yet another bias term that is due to censoring.
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the impact of changes in the average “total tax rate” (or in total tax revenues), we 
look at more disaggregated average tax rates. Ideally, one would like to examine the 
effects of changes in very narrowly defined tax instruments but there are practical 
limits to the level of disaggregation determined by data availability. We concentrate 
on changes in two tax categories, personal income and corporate income taxes.5 
In our sample, personal income tax revenues (we include contributions to social 
insurance in our definition of personal income taxes) have accounted for on aver-
age 74.2 percent of total federal tax revenues while corporate income taxes have 
accounted for 16.4 percent. Thus, the two components comprise the bulk of total 
federal tax revenues.
A. A Tax Narrative for Personal and Corporate Income Taxes
We produce a narrative account of legislated federal personal and corporate 
income tax liability changes in the United States for a quarterly sample covering 
1950:I–2006:IV. The narrative extends Romer and Romer’s (2009a) analysis by 
decomposing the total tax liabilities changes recorded by Romer and Romer (2009a) 
into the following subcomponents: corporate income tax liabilities (CI), individual 
income tax liabilities (II), employment taxes (EM) and a residual category with 
other revenue changing tax measures (OT). We discard the latter group because it 
is very heterogeneous.6 The decomposition is based on the same sources as Romer 
and Romer (2009a) supplemented with additional information from sources such 
as congressional records, the Economic Report of the President, CBO reports, etc. 
whenever required. The online data Appendix describes the construction of the data 
and the historical sources in detail.
To comply with condition (5), which requires that the proxies are orthogonal to 
all nontax structural shocks, we retain only those changes in tax liabilities that were 
unrelated to the current state of the economy. To this end, we adopt Romer and 
Romer’s (2009a) selection of exogenous changes in tax liabilities, which is based 
on a classification of the motivation for the legislative action either as ideological 
or as arising from inherited deficit concerns. Many of those changes in the tax code 
were legislated well in advance of their scheduled implementation. In Mertens and 
Ravn (2012a) we distinguish between unanticipated and anticipated tax changes on 
the basis of the implementation lag, the difference between the dates at which the 
tax change becomes law and when it is implemented. About half of the exogenous 
changes in tax liabilities were legislated at least 90 days before their implementation 
and Mertens and Ravn (2012a) show that there is evidence for aggregate effects of 
legislated tax changes prior to implementation. This means that shocks signaling tax 
5 The macroeconomic literature instead often distinguishes between labor and capital income taxes, see e.g., 
Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994), Jones (2002), or Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2004), which is appealing 
in terms of economic modeling. However, the division into personal and corporate income taxes corresponds more 
closely to the actual policy instruments and observed changes in federal tax liabilities can be much more easily 
assigned to one of these tax categories.
6 II and EM tax changes include adjustments to marginal rates and various deductions and tax credits. CI tax 
changes include a few adjustments to marginal rates and otherwise mainly changes in depreciation allowances 
and investment tax credits. The other tax changes mostly include excise taxes, often targeted to specific industries 
(transportation) or goods (gasoline, automobiles, sport and leisure goods, …), and gift and estate taxes. See the 
online Appendix for details.
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changes in future periods have macroeconomic effects that are distinct from those of 
shocks that change taxes contemporaneously. We focus on unanticipated changes in 
taxes and therefore we retain only those tax changes for which the implementation 
lag is less than one quarter.
Romer and Romer (2009a) describe almost 50 legislative changes in the tax code 
over the sample period, many containing multiple changes in tax liabilities imple-
mented at different points in time. Our narrative measures are a much smaller subset 
because we eliminate all endogenous and/or preannounced tax changes. Our dataset 
contains 13 observations of individual income tax liability changes, two observations 
for employment tax liability changes, and 16 observations for corporate income tax 
liability changes deriving from 21 separate legislative changes to the federal tax 
code. The vast majority of these changes were legislated as permanent changes to 
the tax code. Because there are too few observations for a separate employment tax 
category, we merge the EM and II taxes into a personal income (PI) tax category. All 
our results are very similar if we omit the employment taxes.
We convert the tax liability changes into the corresponding average tax rate 
changes as follows:
 Δ T t PI, narr =  ( II tax liability chang e t + EM tax liability chang e t ) 
 /Personal Taxable Incom e t−1 
 Δ T t CI, narr = CI tax liability chang e t /Corporate Profit s  t−1 , 
where personal taxable income is defined as personal income less government trans-
fers plus contributions for government social insurance. We scale the tax liability 
changes by previous quarter taxable incomes, but our results are nearly identical 
if we instead scale by the contemporaneous or previous year taxable income. The 
resulting narrative measures are depicted in Figure 1 together with NIPA-based 
measures of the average personal income tax rate (APITR) and average corporate 
income tax rate (ACITR), constructed as
 APIT R t =  ( Personal Current Taxe s t + Contributions for Govt. Social Insuranc e t ) 
 /Personal Taxable Incom e t 
 ACIT R t = Taxes on Corporate Profit s t /Corporate Profit s t ,
where all taxes are at the federal level. The Appendix gives the precise data sources.
The (demeaned) narrative measures Δ T t PI, narr and Δ T t CI, narr , shown in Figure 1, 
will be used as proxies for structural innovations to the two average tax rates. 
Both of these average tax rates display considerable variation over time, reflecting 
unanticipated legislative changes to the tax code but also endogenous movements 
in taxes, some resulting from explicit legislative actions and others not. There are 
many different sources of endogeneity in the average tax rates ranging from policy 
responses to macroeconomic shocks to cyclical fluctuations in the administrative 
definition of taxable income versus NIPA income, tax progressivity and changes 
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in the  distribution of income, cyclical variations in tax compliance and evasion, 
etc. The narrative measures Δ T t PI, narr and Δ T t CI, narr contain only legislative actions 
undertaken for reasons unrelated to the current state of the economy and can there-
fore be used to identify the truly exogenous innovations to the APITR and ACITR 
series.
We note that, even though total federal tax revenues as a share of GDP have 
remained fairly stable around 18 percent, the APITR and ACITR series both dis-
play trends over the sample. Figure 1 shows that the APITR has slowly risen from 
Figure 1. Average Tax Rates and Narrative Shock Measures, US 1950:I–2006:IV
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around 10 percent at the beginning of the sample to approximately 18 percent at the 
end of 2006. The two most significant exogenous changes in personal income taxes 
relate to the Revenue Act of 1964, which reduced marginal tax rates on individual 
income, and to the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, which 
reduced marginal tax rates on individual income, capital gains and dividends, and 
increased some tax expenditures. Each of these two pieces of legislation cut average 
personal income tax rates by more than 1 percentage point according to the narrative 
measure. The ACITR instead has fallen significantly over time from over 50 percent 
in the early 1950s to just above 20 percent at the end of the sample period. The 
narrative measure indicates several sizable changes in corporate income taxes. The 
largest change in CI tax liabilities is associated with the repeal of the investment tax 
credit included in the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
We checked whether lagged macro variables Granger cause the narrative shocks 
but we found no such evidence.7 We also tested for predictive power in regressions 
of the uncensored observations of the measured tax shocks and lagged values of key 
variables but did not detect any statistical significance. As a result, the proxy measures 
for the tax shocks  m t are the narrative shock series Δ T t PI, narr and Δ T t PI, narr shown in 
Figure 1 after subtracting the mean of the nonzero observations. In the robustness sec-
tion, we discuss the results for some alternative choices for the proxies.
B. Identifying Tax Shocks
To obtain valid covariance restrictions from the proxy variables  m t , it is essential 
that the measured tax changes are uncorrelated with nontax structural shocks. It is 
however also important to consider whether measured changes in personal income 
taxes are uncorrelated with structural shocks to corporate taxes, and vice versa. If so, 
then each of the two proxy variables can be used in isolation to derive n − 1 restric-
tions, or 2(n − 1 ) in total. In combination with the residual covariance restrictions, 
each set of n − 1 restrictions suffices to identify the impulse response to the respective 
tax shock, see the Appendix. If we cannot impose zero cross-correlations between the 
measured tax changes and structural tax shocks, the identifying assumptions on the 
combined proxy series yield only 2(n − 2 ) restrictions, which is insufficient to disen-
tangle the causal effects of shocks to both types of taxes.
Conditional on a tax change taking place, the correlation between the PI and CI 
narrative tax changes in our sample is 0.42. Insofar that this positive correlation is 
not just due to chance or correlated measurement error, it appears inappropriate to 
treat the narrative PI (CI) tax changes as uncorrelated with exogenous shocks to 
the corporate (personal) tax rate. The positive correlation between the measured 
changes in personal and corporate taxes is natural for a number of reasons. The 
tax narratives record changes in tax liabilities for which the historical documents 
7 Tests of the null hypothesis that the average tax rate, GDP, government spending, and the tax base do not 
Granger cause the narrative shock measure have p-values of 0.70 for the PI tax shock measure and 0.76 for the 
CI tax shock measure. For the variables of our benchmark system below, the p-values are 0.87 and 0.57. For these 
tests we used first differences for the variables as the test is problematic when the data is nonstationary. We also 
performed tests for a range of other variables such as municipal bonds spreads and government debt. The smallest 
p-value (0.23) we found was for the hypothesis that the government debt to GDP ratio does not Granger cause the 
CI narrative measure.
1224 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW juNE 2013
indicate that they were not explicitly motivated by countercyclical considerations. 
Yet they of course still occurred with certain objectives in mind, typically related to 
longer run goals for economic growth or debt reduction. When both personal and 
corporate income taxes are adjusted simultaneously, it is therefore not surprising 
that they are often adjusted in the same direction. Also, given that the tax narratives 
are based on actual legislative actions, the fixed costs of passing legislation naturally 
imply a temporal correlation of the changes in different types of taxes.
For isolating the causal effects of a change in only one of the tax rates, it is thus 
important to control for changes in the other tax rate, which requires imposing more 
restrictions. Consider the following parametrization of the relationship between the 
VAR residuals  u t and structural shocks  ε t :
(15)  u 1t = η  u 2t +  S 1  ε 1t 
(16)  u 2t = ζ  u 1t +  S 2  ε 2t ,
where  u 1t and  ε 1t are the 2 × 1 vectors of reduced form and structural tax rate innova-
tions, whereas the (n − 2 ) × 1 vectors  u 2t and  ε 2t contain the reduced form residuals 
and other structural shocks associated with an arbitrary number of additional vari-
ables. The matrices η, ζ,  S 1 and  S 2 contain the structural coefficients that underlie B. 
In particular, the 2 × 2 nonsingular matrix  S 1 is not necessarily diagonal, capturing 
the potential contemporaneous interdependence of the tax instruments.
Obtaining the responses to  ε 1t requires identification of  β 1 , containing the first two 
columns of B, which is given by
(17)  β 1 =  [   I + η (I − ζη  ) −1 ζ                      (I − ζη ) −1 ζ   ]  S 1 .
In the Appendix, we show that the linear restrictions in (7) allow for the identifica-
tion of the first term in square brackets,  β 1  S 1 −1 , as well as  S 1  S 1 ′ , the covariance of 
S 1  ε 1t . The covariance restrictions are, however, not sufficient to obtain the structural 
decomposition of this covariance and obtain  S 1 . To see this intuitively, note that ζ can 
be estimated by 2SLS using  m t as instruments. Given an estimate of ζ, it is possible 
to use  u 2t − ζ u 1t as instruments to estimate η. Finally, the covariance of  u 1t − η  u 2t 
provides an estimate of  S 1  S 1 ′ . Ideally one would like to identify  S 1 but this requires 
arbitrary assumptions on how personal income taxes respond contemporaneously 
to unanticipated changes in corporate taxes (beyond the indirect contemporaneous 
endogenous effects through  u 2t ), and vice versa. Fortunately, knowledge of  β 1  S 1 −1 
still permits economically meaningful structural responses to any linear combination 
of tax shocks. We report responses that result from a Choleski decomposition of  S 1  S 1 ′ , 
imposing that  S 1 is lower triangular. Suppose for instance that the APITR is ordered 
before the ACITR. Then the response to a negative 1 percentage point ACITR shock is 
the response to an exogenous tax change that lowers the ACITR by 1 percentage point 
but leaves the APITR unchanged in “cyclically adjusted” terms, i.e., after allowing for 
contemporaneous feedback from  u 2t . A shock to the APITR on the other hand induces 
a change in the ACITR through feedback from  u 2t as well as a direct response to the 
APITR shock that is determined by the identified correlation between both tax rates. 
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If  S 1  S 1 ′ is diagonal, the latter correlation is zero and the responses are identical for dif-
ferent orderings of the tax rates.
C. Benchmark Specification and Results
Our benchmark estimates for the dynamic output effects of tax changes are 
based on a VAR with seven variables:  Y t = [APIT R t , ACIT R t , ln( B t PI ), ln( B t CI ), 
ln( G t ), ln(GD P t ), ln(DEB T t )]. APIT R t and ACIT R t are the average tax rates discussed 
above;  B t PI and  B t CI are the personal and corporate income tax bases in real per capita 
terms.  G t is government purchases of final goods, GD P t is gross domestic product, 
DEB T t is federal government debt, all in real per capita terms.8 All fiscal variables 
are for the federal level. Precise data definitions are provided in the Appendix. The 
sample consists of quarterly observations for the period 1950:I–2006:IV. Based on 
the Akaike information criterion, the lag length in the VAR is set to four.
All impulse responses are for a 1 percentage point decrease in either of the two tax 
rates and we show results for a forecast horizon of 20 quarters. We report 95 percent 
confidence intervals computed using a recursive wild bootstrap using 10,000 repli-
cations, see Gonçalves and Kilian (2004). We generate bootstrap draws  Y t b recur-
sively using   δj , j = 1, . . , p and   u t  e t b , where the   δj s and   u t denote the estimates for the 
VAR in (2) and  e t b is the realization of a random variable taking on values of −1 or 
1 with probability 0.5. We also generate a draw for the proxy variables  m t b =  m t  e t b , 
reestimate the VAR for  Y t b and apply the covariance restrictions implied by  m t b . 
The percentile intervals are for the resulting distribution of impulse response coef-
ficients. This procedure requires symmetric distributions for  u t and  m t but is robust 
to conditional heteroscedasticity. It also takes into account uncertainty about identi-
fication and measurement. This contrasts with the typical application of coefficient 
restrictions in SVARs as well as narrative specifications, which often treat  m t as 
deterministic. The standard residual bootstrap is problematic given that  m t contains 
many zero observations, which means that drawing with replacement from  m t yields 
zero vectors with positive probability.
Figures 2 and 3 show the effects of cuts in average personal and corporate income tax 
rates for each ordering of the tax rates. The correlation between the cyclically adjusted 
tax rate innovations  S 1 ε 1t is small and estimated at −0.07 with a 95 percent confidence 
interval [− 0.41, 0.50 ]. As a result, the responses are very similar for the different tax 
rate orderings. This turns out to be a robust finding in sufficiently large VAR systems, 
in particular when they include government debt. When discussing a shock to a tax 
rate, for brevity we therefore only discuss the point estimates resulting from ordering 
that tax rate last, leaving the other tax rate unchanged in cyclically adjusted terms.
Figure 2 shows that after the initial 1 percentage point cut in personal income taxes, 
the APITR remains significantly below the level expected prior to the shock dur-
ing the first year. Thereafter, the APITR gradually converges to pre-shock expected 
levels in the longer run. The cut in the APITR sets off a significant increase in the 
personal income tax base which initially rises approximately 0.6 percent and peaks 
8 Government debt is a potentially important variable since any change in taxes eventually must lead to adjust-
ments in the fiscal instruments. Especially if the reaction to debt is strong and relatively fast, it might be inappropri-
ate not to explicitly allow for feedback from debt to taxes and spending.
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at 1.3 percent one year after the tax cut. Combining the responses of the tax base and 
the personal income tax rate, the decrease in the APITR implies a drop in personal 
income tax revenues of 5.4 percent upon impact.9 Tax revenues remain  relatively 
low until several years after the shock, but recover substantially from the initial drop 
9 The response of tax revenues are computed as  ˆ  t r t =   T t i/ _ T i +   bt i where  _ T i is the mean average tax rate of type 
i = PI, CI in the sample,  ˆ  x t denotes the impulse response of  x t and lower case letters denote logged variables.
Figure 2. Benchmark Specification: An APITR Cut
Notes: Figure shows the responses to a 1 percentage point cut in the APITR. Full lines are point estimates; broken 
lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals.
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during the first year. Despite the increase in the tax base we find that cuts in per-
sonal income taxes unambiguously lower personal tax revenues. Most importantly, 
cuts in average personal income taxes provide a substantial short run output stimu-
lus. A 1 percentage point decrease in the APITR leads to an increase in output of 
1.4  percent in the first quarter and a peak increase of 1.8 percent which occurs three 
quarters after the tax cut. The confidence intervals indicate a significant increase (at 
the 95 percent level) in economic activity within a two year window after the tax cut.
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Figure 3. Benchmark Specification: An ACITR Cut
Notes: Figure shows the responses to a 1 percentage point cut in the ACITR. Full lines are point estimates; broken 
lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 3 shows the effect of a 1 percentage point decrease in the average corporate 
income tax rate. The cut in the ACITR leads to a prolonged period of lower average 
corporate income tax rates. The cut in the ACITR induces a large and significant 
increase in the corporate income tax base which rises by up to 3.8 percent in the 
first six months. The increase in the tax base is sufficiently large such that there is 
only a very small decline in corporate income tax revenues in the first quarter and a 
surplus thereafter. The response of corporate tax revenues is however insignificant 
at every horizon. Hence, cuts in corporate income taxes appear to be approximately 
 self-financing which is suggestive of particularly strong behavioral responses to 
changes in effective corporate tax rates. The output effects of ACITR cuts are again 
significant and substantial. A 1 percentage point decrease leads to a rise in real GDP 
of around 0.4 percent rising up to 0.6 percent about one year after the cut.
In accordance with Romer and Romer (2009b), we find little impact of either tax 
shocks on government spending. Figure 2 shows that the response of government 
spending to an APITR tax cut is insignificantly different from zero at the 95  percent 
level at all forecast horizons. Similarly, there is little evidence that changes in the 
ACITR impact systematically on government spending. This is reassuring since it 
refutes the possibility that the responses to tax shocks are confounded with changes 
in government spending. We also find that cuts in one average tax rate lead to 
increases in the other average tax rate, although neither of these increases is sig-
nificant. The mutual tax rate responses indicate that our orthogonalization scheme 
successfully disentangles the effects of different tax instruments. Government debt 
(not shown) increases significantly at the 95 percent level in the short run after an 
APITR cut, but does not change significantly after an ACITR cut. The debt response 
is more precisely estimated in specifications that include interest rates, which are 
discussed below.
Under the additional measurement error assumptions of Section IB, our procedure 
also allows for the identification of the reliabilities of the proxy variables, which are 
reported in Table 1. The estimated reliability matrix of  m t has eigenvalues of 0.30 and 
0.69 with 95 percent confidence intervals [0.16, 0.48 ] and [0.47, 0.97 ]. This implies 
that the correlations between the principal components of the narrative tax changes 
and the true tax shocks are 0.55 and 0.83. The former number is also the smallest 
correlation of any linear combination of the proxy variables. These statistics indicate 
that the proxies contain valuable information for the identification of the structural 
tax shocks and that there is a reasonably strong connection between the SVAR shocks 
and historically documented legislative changes to the tax code. At the same time, the 
fact that the reliability matrix has eigenvalues substantially below unity indicates that 
measurement error is a serious concern in practice. Table 1 also reports R2 statistics 
for regressions of the reduced form residuals of the average tax rates  u 1t on nonzero 
observations of the proxies.10 The values of 0.22 and 0.38 indicate that the narrative 
shocks explain a sizable fraction the prediction error variance of the average tax rates.
Perhaps the most important result in this paper is that the estimated short run output 
effects of changes in average tax rates are large. Another common metric for these 
effects is the tax multiplier, defined as the dollar change in GDP per effective dollar 
10 We regressed each of the elements of  u 1t on both proxies  m t in the subsample of observations for which at least 
one of the two proxies takes on a nonzero value.
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loss in revenues. Multipliers can be obtained in our SVAR by rescaling the output 
response such that the implied drop in tax revenues is normalized to 1 percent of GDP. 
For the personal income tax we find a multiplier of 2.0 on impact rising to a maximum 
of 2.5 in the third quarter. The same calculation for the corporate income tax instead 
makes little sense given that the estimated impact on revenues is approximately zero.
The results just discussed derive from a VAR which includes other fiscal variables 
such as government spending and debt. Controlling for monetary variables may be 
equally relevant, as monetary policy adjustments are typically very important for deter-
mining the ultimate effects of fiscal shocks in theoretical models. Moreover, changes 
in taxes may impact costs of production and, to the extent that cost changes are passed 
into prices, affect inflation. The sign of the inflation response is indicative of whether 
the expansionary effects of tax cuts are primarily derived from increased demand or 
supply for final goods. For these reasons we estimate an expanded benchmark model 
that also includes monetary policy instruments and inflation in the vector observables. 
We add the following series: the effective federal funds rate, the (log) level of non-
borrowed reserves and the (log) level of the price index for personal consumption 
expenditures. In order to economize on the number of coefficients, we omit the two tax 
bases from the vector of observables.11 The inclusion of the monetary variables yields 
reliabilities and R2 statistics similar to the benchmark specification (see Table 1), with 
the lowest eigenvalue of the reliability matrix now notably higher.
The first row of Figure 4 shows that the output stimuli provided by both types 
of tax cuts are similar in size and timing to the benchmark specification. Thus, the 
output responses to the tax policy shocks appear robust to controlling for monetary 
11 The online Appendix reports results from a specification that simply adds the three additional monetary vari-
ables to the original seven observables (including the tax bases). This produces very similar point estimates but with 
somewhat larger confidence bands.
Table 1—Diagnostic Statistics
 R 2 ( u 1t on  m t )
Specification Reliabilities (eigenvalues) APITR ACITR
Benchmark (Figures 2 and 3) 0.30 0.69 0.22 0.38
[0.16, 0.48] [0.47, 0.97]
With monetary variables (Figure 4) 0.54 0.66 0.23 0.39
[0.30, 0.69] [0.52, 1.00]
Using single tax proxy (Figure 5) 0.38 0.64 0.24 0.16
[0.21, 0.56] [0.55, 0.69]
Annual with average tax rate (Figure 8) 0.54 0.37 —
[0.25, 0.70]
Annual with marginal tax rate (Figure 8) 0.60 0.34 —
[0.40, 0.70]
With labor market variables (Figure 9) 0.46 0.51 0.21 0.17
[0.25, 0.57] [0.42, 0.81]
With consumption variables (Figure 10) 0.27 0.50 0.17 0.29
[0.13, 0.44] [0.33, 0.77]
With investment variables (Figure 10) 0.30 0.69 0.17 0.32
[0.15, 0.49] [0.46, 0.95]
Note: Values in brackets are 95 percent confidence bands computed using 10,000 bootstrap replications.
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Figure 4. Responses with Monetary Policy and Inflation Controls
Notes: Panel A (panel B) shows the responses to a 1 percentage point cut in the APITR (ACITR). Full lines are point 
estimates; broken lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals.
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policy instruments. The second row reports the response of real federal government 
debt per capita, which turns out to be more precisely estimated with the inclusion 
of the monetary variables.12 Government debt increases persistently after an APITR 
cut although the effect is only statistically significant at the 95 percent level in the 
first two quarters. Consistent with the absence of any sizable impact on revenues, 
there is no significant effect on debt from a cut in the corporate tax.
A cut in the APITR is mildly disinflationary on impact and briefly inflationary in 
the third quarter, but none of these effects are significant at 95 percent levels. We 
find a stronger negative impact of a cut in the ACITR on the inflation rate in the short 
run and, in contrast to the results for the APITR, the decline in inflation is persis-
tent and statistically significant at the 95 percent level in the first two quarters. The 
short run disinflationary effects of corporate tax cuts are robust to using alternative 
measures of the nominal price level, such as the GDP deflator or the BLS consumer 
price index. The drop in inflation after a corporate tax cut is consistent with a fall 
in marginal costs and dominating supply side effects. The evidence for changes in 
personal income taxes is inconclusive.
There is no strong evidence that changes in either of the two tax rates impact signifi-
cantly on the short term nominal interest rate, as measured by the funds rate, and we 
found the same when using the three-month T-Bill rate.13 This supports the interpreta-
tion of the impulse responses as the impact of changes in taxes. For the APITR this result 
is not too surprising given there is no clear impact on the inflation rate. For the ACITR 
instead, the short run decline in the inflation rate following a tax cut might instead have 
been expected to trigger a stronger monetary policy accommodation. There are various 
possible explanations including that the drop in inflation is accompanied by an increase 
in aggregate activity and that the impact on inflation is transitory.
D. Discussion and Relationship to the Literature
In order to gain some further understanding of the benchmark results, we elabo-
rate on several aspects of our estimation procedure. First, we discuss the importance 
of allowing for nonzero cross-correlations between the measured tax changes and 
structural tax shocks. Next, we compare our results to those from more standard 
approaches in the narrative identification literature. Finally, we analyze the role of 
using average versus marginal tax rates and compare our findings with some of the 
existing results in the literature.
Correlation between the Proxies and Tax Shocks.—Given the positive correlation 
between the narrative measures, it is likely that the measured changes in one tax rate 
are correlated with shocks to both tax rates. The benchmark specification controls 
for simultaneous changes in both tax rates and resolves the shortage of  identification 
restrictions with a recursivity condition. Here we analyze the consequences of 
 making the alternative assumption that each of the proxies is correlated with only 
12 Our interpretation is that including a nominal interest rate leads to better estimates of government debt 
dynamics.
13 The absence of a strong impact on the interest rate does of course not preclude adjustments in the money 
supply.
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a single tax shock. This assumption ignores the observed correlation between the 
proxies and is only valid if the correlation is due to chance or correlated measure-
ment errors. In practice, it means that each of the proxies can be used in isolation to 
identify the corresponding impulse response functions.
Figure 5 shows the impulse responses of output following a 1 percentage point 
decrease in either of the two tax rates when using a single proxy at a time. The speci-
fication is otherwise identical to the benchmark. For comparison, both figures also 
show the impulse responses from the benchmark specification that result from order-
ing the tax rate that is shocked last, as well as the associated percentile intervals.
Panel A of Figure 5 shows that a cut in the APITR identified with a single proxy 
leads to a persistent decrease in the APITR similar to the benchmark. Panel B shows 
the same is true for the ACITR cut. However, the output responses depend impor-
tantly on whether one controls for the correlation between the proxies or not. When 
the correlation is ignored we find substantially larger effects of corporate income tax 
cuts than in the benchmark specification, while the opposite pattern is evident for 
the personal income tax cut. The sizable differences suggest that it is important to 
control explicitly for the interactions between the different tax  instruments. The 
impact of ignoring the correlation between the proxies is much greater when both 
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average tax rates are included in the vector of observables, as is the case in the bench-
mark specification. In smaller specifications that include only the average tax rate 
and tax base associated with the tax of interest, the impulse responses identified with 
a single proxy are typically much closer to those of our benchmark specification.
Comparison with Traditional Narrative Approaches.—To demonstrate the rel-
evance of our estimation strategy relative to standard narrative approaches, we com-
pare to the following two specifications (omitting constants):
(18) Δ ln (GD P t ) =  ∑ 
j=1
K
  μ j Δ  T t−j+1 i, narr +  e t 
(19)  Y t =  ∑ 
j=1
p
  ν j  Y t−j + ξ Δ  T t i, narr +  e t ,
where Δ T t i, narr (i = PI, CI ) are the narratively identified tax changes. The first of 
these specifications regresses output growth on the contemporaneous and lagged nar-
ratively identified shocks, which is the approach of Romer and Romer (2010). The 
second specification in (19) is a VAR that includes the narrative as an exogenous 
regressor, as in, for instance, Favero and Giavazzi (2012). When estimating (18) we 
set K = 12. Figure 6 depicts the resulting impulse response functions to 1  percentage 
point cuts in Δ T t i, narr together with the results from the benchmark SVAR.
The models in (18)–(19) imply substantially smaller output effects than our bench-
mark model. This is particularly evident for the corporate income tax cut where the 
output responses derived from (18) and (19) are close to zero at all forecast horizons. 
For the personal income tax, the output responses produced by (19) are smaller than 
our estimates at all forecast horizons and significantly so during the first three quarters 
after the tax shock. Specification (18) also delivers estimates of the impact of cuts in 
the average personal income tax rate that are considerably smaller in the short run.
The finding that our estimation approach yields larger output responses to tax 
cuts in the short run also extends to using the aggregate measures of tax shocks 
as in Romer and Romer (2010) and Favero and Giavazzi (2012), see Mertens and 
Ravn (2012b). The main reason can be found in measurement problems. First, we 
scale the tax shocks by their impact on effective average tax rates while the Romer 
and Romer (2010) multiplier estimates are based on projected tax liability calcula-
tions which typically assume that output (and other determinants of tax revenue) 
does not respond to changes in taxes. We have shown above that economic activity 
expands following a tax cut and it therefore follows that the tax changes implicit 
in Δ T t i, narr are smaller than those assumed in the structural estimates we report. 
Secondly, our estimator allows for the presence of random measurement error. We 
discussed in Section IB how this can bias the estimated output responses, often 
in a downward direction.14 Our estimates of the reliability of the proxies indicate 
14 In the context of our measurement equation assumptions, specification (19) necessarily suffers from attenu-
ation bias. One should not jump to the conclusion that all narrative results in the literature are downward biased 
because of measurement error. When lagged or multiple narrative measures are included, measurement error can 
lead to attenuation or expansion bias. Some studies, such as Ramey (2011a), rescale impulse responses according 
to the impact on one of the observables, which can substantially mitigate the problem.
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that measurement error bias is quantitatively relevant. Interestingly, Perotti (2012) 
updates the Romer and Romer (2009a) series with the aim to improve measurement 
and as a result also finds tax multipliers that are relatively larger.
Comparison with Existing Estimates in the Literature.—There are relatively few 
studies which we can use for direct comparison, as most macro estimates are for 
shocks to total taxes. A notable exception is Barro and Redlick (2011), who use 
annual data to estimate the output response to changes in average marginal income 
tax rates (AMTRs) which includes state taxes and excludes most forms of capital 
income taxes. In contrast, our measures of taxes refer to average tax rates, exclude 
state income taxes, and include capital income taxes that are not classified as cor-
porate income taxes. Identification in Barro and Redlick (2011) relies on using the 
year-aggregated Romer and Romer (2009a) series for exogenous total tax liability 
tax changes at the federal level as an instrument in regressions of output growth 
on the tax rate. From the annual data they find that a 1 percentage point cut in the 
AMTR increases next year GDP by 0.5 percent, corresponding to a tax multiplier of 
around 1.1. Our benchmark estimates indicate output effects that are considerably 
larger for changes in federal average personal income tax rates.
The shocks to average tax rates that we identify reflect changes to marginal tax 
rates, as well as tax brackets and tax expenditures, all of which in principle have dis-
tinct influences on economic decisions. Shocks to average marginal rates arguably 
have a more straightforward structural interpretation. The drawback of using marginal 
rates is the annual frequency and that, to our knowledge, no good data is available 
for corporate taxes. Figure 7 plots the annual NIPA-based APITR variable as well as 
the average marginal tax rate constructed by Barro and Redlick (2011). For a better 
comparison, we exclude the contribution of state taxes from their AMTR variable. The 
two tax rates are highly correlated: 0.90 in levels and 0.62 in first differences. To assess 
the role of using average versus marginal rates, we identify shocks to personal income 
tax rates in an SVAR with annual data and two lags of the endogenous variables. 
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Notes: Panel A (panel B) shows the responses to a 1 percentage point cut in the APITR (ACITR). Full lines are point 
estimates; broken lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals.
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To keep the dimension of the VAR manageable as well as mitigate concerns about the 
correlation between the tax changes, we include the benchmark variables but omit 
the corporate tax rate and base. As the tax rate measure  T t PI , we sequentially use the 
APITR and AMTR variables depicted in Figure 7, and rely on the time aggregated 
narrative series Δ T t PI, narr for identification. Interestingly, we estimate a relatively 
high value, 0.60, for the reliability of the annual PI tax proxy as a measure of marginal 
tax rate shocks, see Table 1. The proxy also explains 34 percent of the marginal tax 
rate prediction error variance in the subsample of nonzero observations.
Figure 8 compares the effect of a 1 percentage point cut in the tax rates. The 
output response to a marginal rate cut is highly significant and very similar in size 
to our benchmark estimates. The output response to the average rate cut is some-
what larger in the annual data. Overall, using marginal rates delivers results that 
are broadly similar to our specifications with quarterly frequency and both aver-
age rates. Interesting differences are that the decline in the marginal rate is more 
persistent than the decline in the average rate and that the confidence intervals are 
much narrower when using the marginal rate. Besides other methodological differ-
ences, one possible explanation for why our estimates are higher than in Barro and 
Redlick (2011) is that including preannounced tax changes leads to a downward 
bias. This is because forward looking agents and intertemporal substitution motives 
generate a tendency for preannounced cuts in income taxes to lower output prior to 
implementation, see Yang (2005), Mertens and Ravn (2011, 2012a, b), and Leeper, 
Walker, and Yang (2011) for theory and evidence.15
15 The output response to a marginal rate cut is somewhat closer to Barro and Redlick (2011) when we do not 
remove state taxes. The first-year output response in that case is 0.7 percent, rising to 1.7 percent in the third year.
Figure 7. Annual Observations of the Marginal and Average Tax Rates
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Blanchard and Perotti (2002) estimate the impact of shocks to total tax revenues 
using an SVAR estimator. They find an impact multiplier of 0.69 and a peak multiplier 
of 0.78 in quarterly US data for the sample period 1947–1997. Our estimates imply 
significantly larger effects on economic activity. Mertens and Ravn (2012b) provide a 
detailed analysis of this result and argue that the key discrepancy relates to the elasticity 
of tax revenues to output.16 Mountford and Uhlig (2009) also analyze shocks to aggre-
gate tax revenues identified using sign restrictions. In response to a deficit financed tax 
cut, they estimate multipliers of 0.29 on impact, 0.93 after one year, and up to 3.41 at 
twelve quarters. These numbers are much larger than Blanchard and Perotti (2002) 
at longer horizons, but similar to Blanchard and Perotti (2002) in the short run. This 
contrasts with our finding of large output effects in the shorter run. Romer and Romer 
(2010) estimate the impact of innovations to their aggregate tax liability narrative and 
find that a 1 percent drop in legislated tax liabilities relative to GDP leads to an increase 
in GDP of less than half a percent on impact growing steadily to a 3 percent increase at 
the 10 quarter horizon. Again, these estimates are not directly comparable to ours since 
we consider disaggregated taxes, but as with the SVAR based estimates the main differ-
ence is that we find large output effects in the short run.
E. Robustness
We have investigated the robustness of our main results with respect to several 
issues. For brevity we refer to the online Appendix for the figures and more detail.
The benchmark SVAR is estimated in log levels and the responses at long forecast 
horizons are typically imprecisely estimated. It is possible to make more specific 
assumptions about the long run statistical properties of the time series and SVAR 
16 Blanchard and Perotti (2002) calibrate the output elasticity of tax revenues to 2.08 while in Mertens and 
Ravn (2012b) we estimate a larger elasticity of 3.13 based on the narrative data. The discrepancy explains the entire 
difference between tax multiplier estimates.
Figure 8. Annual VAR: Marginal versus Average Personal Income Tax Rate Changes
Notes: Figure shows the impact of a 1 percentage point cut in the marginal or average personal income tax rates. 
Full lines are point estimates; broken lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals.
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results can be somewhat sensitive to different assumptions about trends, as in, for 
instance, Blanchard and Perotti (2002). We verified our results for a specification 
with the observables in first differences and another with a deterministic linear- 
quadratic time trend. The key features of the short and medium run effects of tax 
shocks, our primary focus, are insensitive to these alternatives. However, differ-
ent trend assumptions matter at longer forecast horizons and determine whether 
tax changes are permanent or temporary. In terms of economic theory, whether 
displacements in tax rates are perceived by agents as permanent or transitory does 
matter importantly; see, for instance, Chetty et al. (forthcoming).
To ensure that our proxies are good measures of unanticipated tax shocks, we 
eliminated all tax liability changes that were implemented more than 90 days after 
the relevant tax changes became law. One might worry that we do not fully address 
the potential problems associated with tax foresight as tax changes may have been 
anticipated even before legislation. In addition, tax foresight may invalidate the 
interpretation of the VAR-based residuals as prediction errors as the conditioning 
variables may not span the information set of forward-looking agents. The mis-
timing of shocks and/or the omission of an important variable can yield mislead-
ing results.17
We verified the sensitivity of our results to including conditioning variables that 
may contain independent information about future fiscal policy. First, we consid-
ered measures of expected future taxes derived from municipal bond prices con-
structed by Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2011). Municipal bonds are exempt from 
federal income taxation in the United States and the spread between the yields on 
municipal bonds and similar tax nonexempt bonds may therefore contain infor-
mation about the market expectation of the present value of income taxes over 
the maturity of the bond; see, for instance, Poterba (1988) and Fortune (1996). 
Imposing a no arbitrage condition, municipal bond spreads result in a measure of 
implicit expected future taxes, see Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2011) for details. 
We used these authors’ measure for bonds with maturity of one and five years 
and added them as additional controls to the benchmark specification. We found 
no evidence that the large output effects of tax cuts are sensitive to controlling 
for municipal yield spreads. While our interest is in estimating the impact of tax 
shocks, preannounced changes in government spending that are not controlled for 
may also give rise to a misalignment of the information sets of the econometrician 
and economic agents. Ramey (2011a) for instance, argues that anticipation effects 
are important for the identification of government spending shocks. We extended 
the vector of observables of the benchmark specification with variables that are 
likely to contain information about future government spending. In particular, we 
included a series for the accumulated excess returns of large US military contrac-
tors constructed by Fisher and Peters (2010), as well as Ramey’s (2011a) defense 
spending news variable in the vector of observables, which contains professional 
forecasters’ projections of the path of future military spending. These extensions 
did not lead to notable changes in the output responses.
17 See Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2011); Ramey (2011a); and Mertens and Ravn (2010).
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A related issue is whether the proxy variables are predictable and for instance 
capture tax changes that were anticipated prior to their legislation. As long as 
the proxies correlate contemporaneously with unanticipated tax shocks and are 
 otherwise orthogonal to other contemporaneous shocks, predictability of the 
 proxies does not violate the identifying assumptions. However, the question is 
whether removing any predictable component yields better proxies for unantici-
pated tax shocks and whether these alternative proxies yield different results. Based 
on standard tests using the benchmark variables, we did not reject Granger non- 
causality. We also used the municipal bond spreads in Granger causality tests and 
as explanatory variables in regressions for the nonzero narrative tax changes, but 
we did not detect any significant predictive power. One may also suspect that the 
narrative tax changes are correlated with the inherited level of government debt, 
especially since a few of the legislative changes were explicitly motivated by bud-
getary concerns. In Granger causality tests and regressions of nonzero tax shock 
observations on lagged debt-to-GDP, we did not find any formal evidence for a 
significant relationship. Because some of these tests may not have much power in 
small samples, we ran the benchmark specification after first regressing the non-
zero observations of our narrative tax measures on lags of the implicit expected tax 
rate variables and debt-to-GDP, and then using the residuals as the proxies for the 
structural shocks. The point estimates derived from these alternative proxies remain 
similar to the benchmark specification and none of them lead to marked improve-
ments in the reliability estimates.
A different potential measurement problem is error in the timing of the tax 
changes. We verified the sensitivity of our benchmark estimates with respect to this 
issue by conducting simulation experiments similar to Ramey (2011a). The esti-
mated output responses remain fairly stable when we assume that up to 50 percent 
of the measured tax change is randomly mistimed by one quarter, either as a lead or 
a lag. Note that unless all of the narrative tax changes misdate the true tax shocks, 
none of our identifying assumptions are violated. Our approach is therefore already 
robust to this type of timing error, which merely results in a loss in precision and 
lower reliability statistics.
III. The Wider Macroeconomic Effects of Tax Changes
An advantage of the narrative approach is that it is straightforward to estimate 
the effects of shocks on other macroeconomic variables. Looking at the impact 
of tax changes on a broader set of variables allows us to gain further insight into 
how tax changes are transmitted to the economy and into possible differences 
between the two tax components. In this section we consider a set of alternative 
VAR systems. Each of these consists of a fixed set of five baseline variables con-
taining the two average tax rates, output, public debt and government spending, 
and a varying set of additional variables. We consider in turn variables related to 
the labor market and private consumption and investment. As in the benchmark 
specification, the  estimates are always very similar for different orderings of the 
tax rates. For brevity, we only report the response to a shock to a tax rate result-
ing from ordering that tax rate last, leaving the other unchanged in cyclically 
adjusted terms.
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A. Labor Market
The labor market often takes center stage in discussions on fiscal policy. Romer 
and Bernstein (2009, p. 2), for example, argue that:
Tax cuts, especially temporary ones, and fiscal relief to the states are likely 
to create fewer jobs than direct increases in government purchases.
However, systematic empirical evidence on the dynamic effects of fiscal inter-
ventions on employment is surprisingly scarce. Ravn and Simonelli (2007) and 
Monacelli, Perotti, and Trigari (2010) find that positive shocks to government 
spending impact negatively on the unemployment rate, but the response is very slow. 
Monacelli, Perotti, and Trigari (2010) investigate the effects of tax shocks on unem-
ployment and other labor market variables and find that tax cuts lead to delayed but 
sizable reductions in unemployment.
To investigate the impact of tax changes on the labor market we add the following 
three variables to the baseline vector of observables: the log of total employment per 
capita, the log of hours worked per worker, and the log of the labor force relative 
to population, all for the aggregate business, government (including military), and 
nonprofit sectors (see the Appendix for precise data definitions). Combining these 
variables, we can also derive estimates of the impact of tax shocks on the unemploy-
ment rate. Figure 9 depicts the impact of a 1 percent cut in the APITR (panel A) and 
in the ACITR (panel B) on the new variables. The responses of the other variables, 
including output, are comparable to the benchmark and are therefore not shown.
Cuts in personal income taxes boost employment and do so relatively quickly. A 
1 percentage point decrease in the APITR leads to a statistically significant rise in 
employment per capita of 0.3 percent on impact. The employment response peaks 
at around 0.8 percent five quarters after the tax stimulus. The labor input response 
to an APITR tax cut is however not restricted to the extensive margin. The number 
of hours worked per worker also rises significantly on impact by 0.4 percent and 
the impact remains significantly positive for the first year. In contrast to the fairly 
elastic short run responses of the labor input at both the intensive and extensive mar-
gins, we find no evidence for significant effects on labor force participation at any 
horizon.18 This is perhaps not surprising given that, the reduction in the APITR is 
fairly transitory, and may therefore provide only limited incentives to enter the labor 
market. The increase in employment and lack of any effect on participation together 
imply a decrease in the unemployment rate of 0.3 percentage points on impact and 
a maximum decrease of slightly more than 0.5 percentage points in the fifth quarter 
after the tax cut.
The results for the ACITR depicted in the right column of Figure 9 indicate that 
changes in corporate taxes have much less pronounced effects on the labor market. 
In contrast to the personal income tax cut, there is no evidence that a cut in cor-
porate taxes is associated with any significant impact on employment, despite the 
considerable and significant immediate increase in output. Instead, there is a  gradual 
18 Interpreting the shock as a cut in the marginal rate on labor and assuming no wealth effects or impact change in 
the pre-tax real wage, the estimated labor response implies a wage elasticity of aggregate labor supply of around 0.5.
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Figure 9. Labor Market Responses to Tax Cuts
Notes: Panel A (panel B) shows the responses to a 1 percentage point cut in the APITR (ACITR). Full lines are point 
estimates; broken lines indicate 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals, respectively.
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rise in employment that however never becomes statistically significant. The maxi-
mum increase in employment after a 1 percent cut in the ACITR is 0.3 percent. 
Another difference with the cut in personal income taxes is that there is no signifi-
cant impact on hours worked per worker at any horizon. As was the case with the 
APITR cut, labor force participation is unaffected. We find that a cut in corporate 
taxes lowers the rate of unemployment after a few quarters, but the effect is very 
gradual and never statistically significant.
An interesting question is how the labor market effects are distributed across the 
public and private sector. We repeated the analysis above for employment in the two 
sectors (see the online Appendix for details) and found that the positive response of 
total employment to a cut in average personal income taxes is composed of a more 
strongly positive private sector employment response and a temporary drop in pub-
lic sector employment. The private sector employment response to a cut in corporate 
taxes is close to the response of total employment, while public sector employment 
drops marginally for two quarters after the tax cut.
We draw two conclusions: First, there are important differences in how per-
sonal and corporate income tax changes affect the labor market. Studies that focus 
exclusively on total average tax rates or revenues are therefore only of limited use 
for assessing the ability of tax policy to affect employment at various horizons. 
The second conclusion is that when the prime policy objective is to create jobs 
relatively fast, cuts in personal income taxes are probably the best fiscal instru-
ment.19 The employment effects of cuts in corporate taxes are more delayed and 
less certain. The studies cited above suggest that the same is true for government 
spending increases.
B. Private Expenditure Components
Changes in taxes are often implemented with the aim of stimulating private con-
sumption or setting the economy on a path of higher investment and higher prosperity 
in the long run. Thus, it is interesting to examine how tax changes affect private sec-
tor spending and saving. For the estimation of the responses of private consumption, 
we add consumption of nondurable goods and services, durable goods purchases, and 
personal taxable income to the baseline variables. For investment, we add nonresi-
dential investment and residential investment as well as corporate profits.
Figure 10 shows the responses of the private consumption and investment expen-
diture components following a 1 percentage point cut in the APITR (panel A) and 
in the ACITR (panel B), respectively. In response to a cut in the APITR,  nondurable 
and services consumption rises by 0.1 percent on impact and  subsequently increases 
gradually to a peak response of just above 0.4 percent which occurs around two 
years after the tax cut. The consumption response appears roughly consistent 
with permanent income predictions for persistent changes in disposable income: 
it is more muted and smoother relative to the response of personal income. 
19 Monacelli, Perotti, and Trigari (2011) also separately estimate the effects of business and labor taxes. When 
expressed in terms of multipliers, our results are entirely consistent with their finding that the effects of business 
taxes on employment are larger than those of labor taxes. Relative to their estimates, our results imply larger effects 
on unemployment which in the case of labor taxes are also more immediate.
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Figure 10. Consumption and Investment Responses to Tax Cuts
Notes: Panel A (panel B) column shows the responses to a 1 percentage point cut in the APITR (ACITR). Full lines 
are point estimates; broken lines indicate 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals, respectively.
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However, the response is imprecisely estimated and not statistically significant. 
Durable goods purchases rise on impact by 3.6 percent and remain higher at 5 percent 
for two years after the tax stimulus. The positive response of nondurable purchases 
is significant at the 95  percent level for more than a year after the cut in the APITR.
The positive consumption response to an APITR cut contrasts with the response to a 
cut in the ACITR, which induces a decline in nondurable and services consumption that 
is marginally statistically significant at the 90 percent level on impact, but not thereaf-
ter. Durable goods purchases decline slightly but insignificantly so. Since a corporate 
tax cut more or less directly increases the return on saving, the consumption decline 
is indicative of substitution effects dominating income effects. We also looked at the 
response of the personal savings rate, which increases after both types of tax cuts.
The impact on private nonresidential investment is more uniform across the two tax 
components. A 1 percentage point cut in the APITR sets off a 2.1  percent increase in 
nonresidential investment in the quarter of the tax cut rising to a maximum of 4  percent 
after one year. The corresponding numbers for the ACITR are an impact increase in 
 nonresidential investment of 0.5  percent and a peak increase of 2.3 percent after six quar-
ters. Relative to the size of the output response, these numbers imply a stronger invest-
ment response to the ACITR than the APITR. In both cases the response of  nonresidential 
investment is statistically significant for multiple quarters. Residential investment 
also responds positively to cuts in both types of taxes, although only significantly so 
for the ACITR.
Changes in taxes thus impact importantly on the key spending components, but 
there is an important difference between personal and corporate income taxes. 
Changes in either type of taxes boost investment, but only personal income tax cuts 
have short run positive effects on consumption expenditures, whereas corporate tax 
cuts do not affect or even lower consumption expenditures. We emphasize though 
that the estimates for consumption are relatively imprecise.
IV. Concluding Remarks
Our analysis shows that changes in taxes have important consequences for the econ-
omy. This is important given the current debate on the efficacy of fiscal policy and 
on the possible consequences of the fiscal consolidation that is bound to take place 
over the coming years. The evidence we contribute in this paper is supportive (i) for 
relatively large and immediate output effects following changes in average tax rates; 
(ii) for tax multipliers that are larger than most estimates of government spending 
multipliers; (iii) for personal income tax cuts being more effective in creating jobs and 
stimulating consumption in the short run than cuts to corporate profit taxes; and (iv) 
for changes in corporate tax rates being approximately revenue neutral.
We find important differences in the effects on various macroeconomic aggre-
gates after distinguishing between different types of taxes. Studies that focus on 
changes in total tax revenues alone can therefore only provide limited insight into 
a complex tax transmission mechanism and offer little guidance for judging the 
relative merits of different types of tax changes. On the other hand, the shocks to 
average tax rates that we identify still reflect changes to marginal tax rates as well 
as other tax policy instruments. The main benefit of such aggregation is that it 
allows for controlling for macroeconomic conditions as traditionally emphasized 
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in the macro literature. This approach is complementary to single event studies 
of macro data, such as House and Shapiro (2006) or those surveyed in Chetty et 
al. (forthcoming), that do not explicitly control for macroeconomic conditions but 
can incorporate much greater legislative detail.
There are several interesting avenues for future research. Firstly, it would be inter-
esting to apply the methodology to data from other countries. Tax narratives are 
becoming increasingly available, see e.g., Cloyne (2013) for the United Kingdom 
and the IMF (2010) for a broad selection of countries. It is likely that measure-
ment errors are systematic features of these narrative accounts making our approach 
attractive. Secondly, it would be interesting to confront the evidence that we have 
uncovered with macroeconomic models and examine its congruence with eco-
nomic theory. Another possible direction is to allow for time-varying effects of fiscal 
shocks, as in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012). Finally, our methodology lends 
itself to applications to government spending and monetary policy where narrative 
policy measures are available. The methodology can also be used without availabil-
ity of narrative measures as long as other proxies are available. Such applications 
could be very helpful in bringing about further evidence about the impact of structural 
shocks.
Appendix
A. Identification
In this Appendix, we provide the identification of the impulse response functions 
and reliability statistics in terms of observable data moments  Σ u u ′  ,  Σ m u ′  , and  Σ m m ′  . 
The identifying covariance restrictions are  Σ u u ′  = BB′ and (7). These restrictions 
yield the following closed form solutions:
(A1)  β 11  S 1 −1 = (I −  β 12  β 22 −1  β 21  β 11 −1 ) −1 
(A2)  β 21  S 1 −1 =  β 21  β 11 −1 (I −  β 12  β 22 −1  β 21  β 11 −1 ) −1 
(A3)  S 1  S 1 ′ = (I −  β 12  β 22 −1  β 21  β 11 −1 )  β 11  β 11 ′ (I −  β 12  β 22 −1  β 21  β 11 −1 )′,
where
  β 21  β 11 −1 = ( Σ m u 1 ′  −1  Σ m u 2 ′  )′ 
  β 12  β 22 −1 =  ( β 12  β 12 ′ ( β 21  β 11 −1 )′ +  ( Σ 21 −  β 21  β 11 −1  Σ 11 ) ′ ) ( β 22 β ′ 22 −1 )
  β 12  β 12 ′ =  ( Σ 21 −  β 21  β 11 −1  Σ 11 ) ′  Z −1  ( Σ 21 −  β 21  β 11 −1  Σ 11 ) 
  β 22  β 22 ′ =  Σ 22 +  β 21  β 11 −1  ( β 12  β 12 ′ −  Σ 11 ) ( β 21  β 11 −1 )′ 
  β 11  β 11 ′ =  Σ 11 −  β 12  β 12 ′ 
 Z =  β 21  β 11 −1  Σ 11 ( β 21  β 11 −1 )′ −  ( Σ 21 ( β 21  β 11 −1 )′ +  β 21  β 11 −1  Σ 21 ′ ) +  Σ 22 ,
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where the  Σ ij s denote the elements of the appropriate partitioning of  Σ u u ′  . When a 
single proxy is used, i.e., k = 1, the first column of B is determined (up to a signing 
convention) since  S 1 S 1 ′ is a scalar. With multiple proxies k > 1, the identification of 
the structural impulse responses is completed by a Choleski decomposition of  S 1 S 1 ′ .
Under the additional restrictions of the measurement error model, the reliability 
matrix is identified by
(A4) Λ =  1 _ 
d
 Σ mm −1  Σ m u 1 ′  ( β 11 β ′ 11 −1  Σ m u 1 ′  ′ ) ,
where d is the fraction of uncensored observations of  m t . For the univariate case (k = 1),  β 11 and the shocks  ε 1t are identified. The scalar reliability of  m t can in that 
case also be estimated in a sample of length T by
(A5) Λ =  ( Γ 2  ∑ 
t=1
T
  D t  ε 1t 2 +  ∑ 
t=1
T
  D t ( m t − Γ ε 1t ) 2 ) −1  Γ 2  ∑ 
t=1
T
  D t  ε 1t 2 ,
where Γ =  ( ∑ t=1 T  D t  m t  u 1t / ∑ t=1 T  D t ) / β 11 . The advantage of (A5) over (A4) is that it 
always lies in the unit interval. We therefore prefer this estimator when k = 1.
B. Data Definitions and Sources
Population is total population over age 16 from Francis and Ramey (2009) 
(nipop16 ); Output is Real GDP obtained from the National Income and Product 
Accounts (NIPA) published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (NIPA Table 1.1.3 
line 1) divided by population; Government spending is Real Federal Government 
Consumption Expenditures and Gross Investment (NIPA Table 1.1.3 line 22) 
divided by population; The personal income tax base is NIPA personal income 
(NIPA Table 2.1 line 1) less government transfers (NIPA Table 2.1 line 17) plus 
contributions for government social insurance (NIPA Table 3.2 line 11); The cor-
porate income tax base is NIPA corporate profits (NIPA Table 1.12 line 13) less 
Federal Reserve Bank Profits (NIPA Tables 6.16 B-C-D). The tax bases are deflated 
by the GDP deflator (NIPA Table 1.1.9 line 1) and by population; The average per-
sonal income tax rate (APITR) is the sum of federal personal current taxes (NIPA 
Table 3.2 line 3) and contributions for government social insurance divided by the 
personal income tax base; The average corporate income tax rate (ACITR) is 
federal taxes on corporate income excluding Federal Reserve banks (NIPA Table 3.2 
line 9) divided by corporate profits (excl. Fed profits). Debt is Federal Debt Held 
by the Public from Favero and Giavazzi (2012) (DEBTHP), divided by the GDP 
deflator and population. The PCE price index is the implicit deflator for Personal 
Consumption Expenditures (NIPA Table 1.1.9 line 2); The federal funds rate is 
from Romer and Romer (2010) which they extended back to 1950:I; Nonborrowed 
Reserves is from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) databank published by 
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED series BOGNONBR), extended back 
to 1950:I by subtracting borrowed reserves (FRED: BORROW) from total reserve 
balances (FRED: RESBALNS) after adjusting for changes in reserve requirements 
using the reserve adjustment magnitude from the St. Louis Fed. Employment/
Population is total economy employment from Francis and Ramey (2009), divided 
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by population; The Labor Force/Population is the sum of employment and the 
number of unemployed (FRED, series UNEMPLOY) divided by population; Hours 
per worker is total economy hours worked from Francis and Ramey (2009) divided 
by employment. Consumption of Nondurable Goods And Services is the chain-
aggregated nondurable and services consumption obtained using data from NIPA 
Tables 1.1.5 and 1.1.9, divided by the population; Durable Goods Purchases, 
Nonresidential and Residential Investment are from NIPA Table 1.1.3 (lines 4, 9, 
and 12) and were divided by the population.
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